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1. Introduction
Imitation has played an important role in the recent literature on learning in economics.1 This is not
surprising since imitation seems easy and straightforward. It does not use particularly many cognitive skills
and it does not require much information. Social imitation certainly qualifies as a ‘fast and frugal
heuristics for making decisions’ (Gigerenzer & Goldstein [1996]). Conventional wisdom seems to assert
that in situations with little information or understanding, imitation of the successful behavior of others
is likely.2 Yet imitation, although deemed easy, is not necessarily a realistic mode of behavior in some
environments. To assess the extent of imitative behavior, we set up an experimental symmetric Cournot
market under different information treatments, some of them very conducive to imitation. The choice of
a symmetric Cournot market is not accidental. First, recent theoretical results (see Vega-Redondo [1997])
show that under general evolutionary dynamics, a Cournot market in which firms (loosely) imitate the
more successful firms converges to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium. This implies that we can use
the market outcomes as a proxy for the possible presence of imitation. Second, any symmetric game
facilitates imitation of successful behavior. Absence of imitation in such games would be damaging
evidence against the prevalence of imitation.
Our experimental results show that even in situations in which imitation seems straightforward, subjects
are reluctant to resort to it. Two complementary hypotheses may explain this result. First, subjects need
not be naive learners. They realize that their environment is not stationary. Second, even in a difficult
Cournot environment, subjects learn soon enough to recognize that imitation of successful behavior may
reduce their profits. To infer from our results that imitation is not a good description of market behavior
may be stretching our observations in excess. After all, in real markets, forces may be at play that are kept
out of our experiments. Nevertheless, our results certainly question any uncritical acceptance of imitation
as an obvious mode of behavior in markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss Cournot oligopoly models.
In section 3 we present our experimental design. Section 4 contains the analysis of the data, and section
5 concludes.
1 For example, in evolutionary economics or industrial organization in the Schumpeter tradition (Nelson & Winter
[1982]), in evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and related processes (Weibull [1995]), and in
computational economics with, e.g., Genetic Algorithms (Sargent [1993]).
2 To quote Bikhchandani et al. [1998]: “Social observers have long recognized imitation as important in human
society. Machiavelli (1514) wrote: "Men nearly always follow the tracks made by others and proceed in their affairs
by imitation." The philosopher Eric Hoffer (1955) asserted: "When people are free to do as they please, they usually
imitate each other"” (p. 152).3
2. Competitive Output in Cournot Markets
As is well-known, output levels in Cournot markets may approach competitive output levels as the
number of firms increases, because the Cournot-Nash equilibrium converges to the Walrasian competitive
output. But there are two forms of behavior that can sustain the competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium, even
in Cournot markets with few players.
First, agents may have a preference for beating their opponents. This can be identified with what has
been called spiteful behavior, i.e., choosing an action that hurts oneself, but others even more (see
Hamilton [1970]). As explained in appendix A, in a Cournot market, a firm that stays closer to its equal
share of the Walrasian output tends to realize higher profits than its competitors. The classic reference in
the experimental economics literature is Fouraker & Siegel [1963], which is a detailed study of (rivalistic)
behavior in oligopolies. In later experimental work (e.g., Holt [1995], or Davis [1995]), spiteful behavior
has been observed occasionally. It is claimed, then, that some players simply like to beat their opponents,
even at the cost of spoiling the party (see also Levine [1998]).
The second way to reach the Walrasian equilibrium in a Cournot market with few players is through
the adaptive behavior of boundedly rational firms. The central message following from Schaffer [1989],
Rhode & Stegeman [1995], and Vega-Redondo [1997] is that any adaptive mechanism in which the
probability of choosing a certain action is a positive monotonic function of the payoffs generated will
eventually lead to the Walrasian equilibrium, provided there is enough noise. As Vega-Redondo [1997]
shows, the convergence is not due to the specifics of a particular example, but it is true with great
generality in symmetric Cournot oligopoly games.
Both forms of behavior bring about a spite effect, i.e., a generalized reduction of profits, that affects
to a larger degree the previously most successful firm. But, of course, these forms of behavior do not
exhaust the possibilities for a spite effect. This effect will appear as well in evolutionary selection
processes if the likelihood to survive selection pressure is a positive monotonic function of a species’
biological fitness. Similarly, we may find it as a form of strategic behavior in dynamic games. For
example, in the context of a struggle for survival, when some agents deliberately trade short term gains
for long term ones, in an effort to get rid of rivals.3
More interestingly, in our context, a spite effect may also be observed if subjects follow consciously
a dynamic strategy that implies reciprocating behavior.4 A Cournot game can be interpreted as a game
3 See, for example, the confrontation between easyJet and BA, in which easyJet publicly accuses BA of being
copycats.
4 Fouraker & Siegel [1963], although they stress the subjects’ preferences in their explanation of behavior, also
notice that rivalistic actions might be related to the dynamics of the game. A player might be motivated solely by
his own profits but employ the rivalistic signal as a means of increasing those profits. Notice that this departs from
the pure psychological disposition point of view, but it is still far from considering adaptive behavior and bounded
rationality as such. Notice also that there are two aspects of learning in an oligopoly game. First, learning about the
(continued...)4
in which firms choose degrees of cooperation, full cooperation meaning that the subjects produce the joint-
monopoly (Pareto) output level. A reciprocating strategy of the type ‘give as good as you get’, or GGG,
could bring about the spite effect if cooperation fails to be achieved. Notice that when looking at
individual decisions, it may be impossible to distinguish between blind imitation of successful behavior
and a deliberate reciprocating strategy. Yet the distinction appears to be crucial. Not only are these two
types of behavior fundamentally different mental processes, but they may also lead to sharply different
outcomes. In a Cournot market, imitation of the most successful firm (with noise) can only lead to a
competitive equilibrium, while a deliberate GGG strategy, if successful, may take the market into the
opposite direction, towards full cooperation.
Therefore, if firms rely on some form of imitation of the output decisions of the more successful
firms,5 then the spite effect will manifest itself in the Cournot market as competitive output levels with
low profits. But output levels around the Walrasian equilibrium, may or may not be due to imitation.
However, if output levels turn out to be low, they do not show a trend towards the competitive output,
and there is enough noise or experimenting, then we know, without having to look into the individual
decisions, that imitation of the most profitable decision is not prevalent enough to affect significantly the
output levels in the Cournot market.6
3. Experimental Design
We conducted seven experimental sessions in the computerized experimental laboratory LeeX at the
Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona in Winter/Spring 1997. The experiment was based on the classic
Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments designed by Fouraker & Siegel [1963], and subsequently
modified (see Holt [1985]). For both the duopolies and triopolies we used three treatments based on
different information setups.7 For each treatment there were 18 players simultaneously in the laboratory.
Players sat in front of personal computers, and could not observe the screens of other players nor
communicate with them. As will be explained below, the time that a session lasted depended on the
4(...continued)
environment. Second, learning about the behavior of one’s opponent. This second form seems loosely related to what
Fouraker & Siegel call ‘the dynamics of the interaction between the players’, but is not recognized by them as a
learning issue.
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6 An alternative way of detecting imitation might be to ask the players. This should be done with great care since
players need not be aware of fact that they are imitating each other. For example, a study based on a Fourier analysis
of the voices in the Larry King Live talk show revealed interesting convergence patterns in the frequencies used by
the host and his interviewed guests, but it seems unlikely that they were doing this consciously (Mirsky [1996]).
7 In addition to these six treatments we ran one control treatment, in which we rewarded the players for their
relative performance (see below).5
treatment. It ranged from about one to about two hours. The average payment over the 126 players was
2200 pesetas (» US$ 15). Examples of the instructions given to the players can be found in appendix B.
3.1 The Standard Cournot Model
We consider a standard symmetric Cournot oligopoly. There is a number n of firms producing the same
homogeneous commodity. The only decision variable for firm i is the quantity qi to be produced. We
assume that the inverse demand function is P(Q) = a + bQ, where Q = Sqi, a > 0, and b < 0, with the exact
values of a and b differing from treatment to treatment (see below). The n players are firms competing
in the same market for 22 consecutive periods. The total costs for a firm are given by C(q) = kq + K ,
with k > 0, and K < 0, ensuring positive profits at Walrasian output levels. Given the market price P, the
profit V for an individual player is computed as follows: V = Pq - C .
3.2 Treatments: Duopolies and Triopolies
Since there were always 18 players simultaneously in the laboratory, 9 duopoly or 6 triopoly markets
were going on at the same time. The players were matched randomly, and anonymously, to form markets,
and they played for consecutive 22 periods in the same market. In our experiment, unlike in Fouraker &
Siegel [1963], subjects knew the length of the experimental sessions. Players also knew whether it was
a duopoly or triopoly they were in, but they did not know who was in their market. In the duopolies, the
inverse demand curve was P = 414 - 4Q, and the cost function C = 174q - 146. In the triopoly these were:
P = 530 - 4Q, and C = 174q - 266.
We can distinguish the following three symmetric pure strategy equilibria for the static Cournot game:
the joint-monopoly Pareto (P), the Cournot-Nash (N), and the competitive Walrasian output (W). Given
the specifications of the demand and cost functions, these three equilibria in the duopoly are QP = 30 (with
qP = 15), QN = 40 (with qN = 20), and QW = 60 (with qW = 30). And in the triopoly they are QP = 45
(with qP = 15), QN = 66 (with qN = 22), and QW = 90 (with qW = 30).8
Players can choose a quantity from 8 to 32 and are allowed to enter only integer values for their output
8 See appendix A for the formal analysis of the Cournot oligopoly. Due to the integer restriction, there are some
asymmetric equilibria as well. In the duopoly, one firm producing 19, and the other 21 would be an asymmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the triopoly QP = 45 gives the only symmetric Pareto equilibrium, but it is not strict
since Q = 44 would give the same total profits. Also the Cournot-Nash equilibrium leading to QN = 66 is not strict
since one player could deviate to qN = 23 and be equally well-off. In fact, QN = 67 is an asymmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. The Walrasian equilibrium occurs at QW = 89. Hence, when all firms produce 29, two want to deviate
to 30, and when all produce 30, one wants to deviate to 29. Nevertheless, qW = 30 is an equilibrium in the sense that
it is the only symmetric output where no player can realize a higher profit than the other two by deviating
unilaterally.6
levels. Notice that the Walrasian individual output level of 30 is near the upper bound of the output range.
Had we allowed for a higher range of output, random output choice or choice in the middle of the output
range might have resulted in market output levels close to Walras, confounding the effect of imitation of
successful firms.
3.3 Treatments: ‘Bounded Rationality’
We consider three different treatments that differ in the way the information is provided, and the time
pressure put on the players. Yet, the underlying market is exactly the same in the three treatments, and
in fact, the objectively ‘available’ information is exactly the same in each treatment. Consequently, the
theoretical benchmarks provided by the equilibria computed above are appropriate for all treatments. If
some pieces of information were objectively missing in one treatment, even fully rational agents might
converge to different output levels.
The difference among treatments lies in how difficult it is to construct this information from the data
provided and the market behavior. We call these three treatments ‘easy’, ‘hard’, and ‘hardest’, and we
claim that subjects are more boundedly rational as we move from easy to hard to hardest treatments, in
the sense that they have less time and the information is provided in a more confusing format. In the
‘easy’ treatment there is no time pressure on the players. They can spend as much time as they want. In
the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ treatments, players have just one minute to decide on their output level.
The differences in information setup between the three versions are more involved. In neither of them
did the players get the demand and cost functions as such. In the ‘easy’ version, the players were given
a profit table that conveniently summarized all the information concerning the inverse demand curve and
the cost function (see appendix B). This profit table contains for each combination of outputs, the profits
for the firms. The column entry shows the output of firm X, and the row entry the output of the other firm
(duopoly) or the average output level of the other firms (triopoly). The cells show the profits of firm X,
and the profits the other firm (duopoly) or the average of the profits of the other firms (triopoly). Hence,
in the ‘easy’ treatment, there was no need for additional learning about the environment, or about the exact
demand and cost functions used. In this treatment, after each period, each player gets information about
the actions of each of the other players in the same market, but not about their profits. Notice, however,
that if they wanted, they could look up the profits of the other players in the profit table. In addition, in
the ‘easy’ version a player always gets a complete history of his own past actions and profits. The way
this information appears on the screen can be seen in figure B1 in appendix B.
In the ‘hard’ version, the players did not get the convenient profit table. Instead, they got an
inconveniently arranged enumeration of the market prices associated with all possible aggregate output
levels. They got a similarly arranged enumeration of all possible cost levels. Since the players knew that7
their profits were simply their revenues minus their costs, and they knew that all firms were identical, they
had exactly the same information as in the ‘easy’ version, although less discernible. The history provided
to the subjects was also different from the previous treatment. After each period, both the actions of all
players in the same market in that period, and the profits obtained by each player were given on the screen
(see figure B2 in appendix B). In addition, to make sure that subjects did not miss what output decision
had led to the highest profit, it appeared on the screen with a border of *s.
Finally, the ‘hardest’ version differed from the ‘hard’ treatment in that the information about the
demand side of the market was limited to the statement that ‘the price level depends on aggregate output’.
The differences between the ‘easy’, and the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ versions can be summarized as follows.
In the ‘easy’ version, by providing subjects with a convenient profit table, we minimize the need for
further learning about the environment and we facilitate best replies. As we move into the ‘hard’ and
‘hardest’ versions, we scramble the information about the market, increasing the subjects’ need to learn
about the environment. This, combined with the one-minute time pressure, become obstacles to ‘doing the
best one can’.9 In addition, we provide flashing information about the most successful decision in each
period, facilitating imitation of it.
Conventional wisdom claims that imitation should be more prevalent the more complex the subjects’
decision task is. Therefore, showing that imitation does not frequently occur when subjects can easily
compute best replies or when they are little aware of what other subjects are doing would not be
surprising. But this scenario, which corresponds to the ‘easy’ treatment, can be used as a benchmark. The
question, then, is whether imitation would be more frequent in more difficult environments, when the
players are more boundedly rational in the sense that their time and information constraints are tighter.
The purpose of the second and third treatments is to explore this question.
3.4 Monetary Incentives
In all treatments, each player gets a show-up fee of 250 pesetas (» US$ 1.65). If a player realized
losses, these would be subtracted from the ‘show-up’ fee. This was known to the players. No player
realized cumulative losses. In addition, players were paid depending on their performance, the details of
the payoff scheme applied being known by the players. In the duopolies, the monetary payoff was 0.035
pesetas per profit point realized during periods 1 to 20, and 0.35 pesetas in the last two periods 21 and
9 To readers not fully convinced about the relevance of the difference between the ‘easy’, and the ‘hard’ and
‘hardest’ versions, we suggest the following two exercises, which will take exactly one minute each. Look at the
instructions for the ‘hard’ duopoly with absolute performance payoff in table B2 in appendix B. What is your output
choice? 30 seconds, 50 seconds, 1 minute. Now, suppose that you chose 21 (with profits 1322), whereas your
competitor chose 25 (profits 1546). What is your next choice? 30 seconds, .... You can check the quality of your
choices with the profit table supplied for the ‘easy’ version in appendix B.8
22. In the triopolies the coefficients were 0.025 and 0.25. These coefficients varied between duopoly and
triopoly in order to compensate for the fact that profit opportunities are different in these markets. The
result was identical monetary incentives across the different information treatments.
The decision to make the payoffs of periods 21 and 22 ten times higher reflects our interest, as will be
explained in section 4, in these last two periods. The higher payoffs were incentives for the players to stay
concentrated till the very end. In addition, they were meant to reinforce the so-called ‘end effect’, making
collusive and strategic behavior more unlikely during the last periods,10 thereby encouraging higher
output levels. In these circumstances, levels of output below Walras give additional credibility to a
conclusion of little imitation.
In addition to the treatments mentioned above, we also ran a session with an ‘easy’ duopoly treatment
in which players were rewarded by their relative, instead of their absolute, performance. After each period,
only the player who made the largest profit received a fixed positive payoff (100 pesetas during each of
the periods 1 to 20, and 1000 pesetas in periods 21 and 22), while the other player(s) got nothing. When
two players have the same profit, they share the monetary reward of the winner. The main purpose of this
treatment was to verify that the ‘easy’ treatment was very easy indeed, and that our experimental set-up
did not contain any insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of the Walrasian output expected in such
a treatment, given the induced preference to beat their opponents. Indeed, a Walrasian output level of 30
was chosen by 100% of the players in the last two periods in this control treatment.
4. Analysis
As explained in section 3, the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ treatments should be particularly conducive to
imitation. The intuition being that when the subjects are more intensely confronted with their bounded
rationality, imitation of the successful firm becomes a prevalent mode of behavior. We therefore formulate
the hypothesis to be tested in the following terms:
Hypothesis: In the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ treatments, the occurrence of imitation will make the
Walrasian equilibrium the best description of the Cournot market in the last two periods.
The hypothesis was rejected by the experiment. It appears that the bounded rationality factor did not
induce players to imitate much. We now explain in detail how we derive this conclusion. Our analysis of
the experimental data begins focussing on the last two periods, the standard approach when it comes to
testing an equilibrium hypothesis (see Crawford [1998]).
10 Notice that since the game is a finitely repeated one with complete information, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium is playing the equilibrium of the stage game anyway.9
duopolies triopolies
market ‘easy’ ‘hard’ ‘hardest’ ‘easy’ ‘hard’ ‘hardest’
1 20.00 15.75 25.00 24.50 26.00 28.67
2 19.75 22.00 16.75 21.83 21.67 23.83
3 18.00 26.25 22.50 25.50 24.83 29.33
4 16.75 23.00 20.25 23.33 29.83 20.83
5 20.00 26.00 20.00 24.17 18.83 27.83
6 18.50 31.00 22.50 22.83 24.50 27.67
7 15.75 16.50 25.75
8 15.00 27.75 23.75
9 20.00 22.00 24.75
average 18.19 23.36 22.36 23.69 24.28 26.36
Table 1 Average output in last two periods for each market
4.1 The last two periods
Table 1 presents the average output level in the last two periods for each market in the various
treatments. These output levels are the independent observations (9 for each duopoly treatment, and 6 for
each triopoly) for our statistical tests on which our conclusions rely. In the following we present graphs
of the individual output levels in the last two periods, and for presentational reasons we report some
statistical tests corresponding to these 36 individual observations. Although this obviously neglects the
possible interdependence between the individual output levels in a given market, these tests invariably lead
to the same qualitative conclusions as the tests based on the independent market observations (not reported














Figure 1 Frequency distribution of individual output levels in the ‘easy’ duopoly, last two periods10
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of actions in the last two periods for the ‘easy’ duopolies.
Notice that a Pareto output of 15 is the most frequently chosen (14 out of 36 times), followed by a
Cournot-Nash output (13 times). In period 21 there were ten colluding players, and four of them persisted
in colluding in the last period. Since no output larger than 22 was chosen, no subject got close to the
Walrasian output of 30. A sign test shows that the 90% confidence interval for the median output ranges
from 16 to 19. These results are in agreement with Fouraker & Siegel [1963], and other previous
experiments. But whereas most of those experiments focused on possible explanations for the persistence
or unraveling of collusion (see Holt [1995] for a survey), we will merely use the ‘easy’ markets as the
benchmark treatment.
The data do not suggest a preference for beating the opponents. Assuming that preferences remain
constant across the treatments, any differences in the output levels in the other treatments can be attributed
to a bounded rationality effect. Will the Walrasian output become more prevalent as the task of learning






























Figure 2 Frequency distributions of individual output levels in the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ duopoly,
last two periods
Figures 2.a and 2.b give the frequency distributions of the output levels in the last two periods of the
‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ duopoly treatments. In the ‘hard’ case, output is spread along the whole range, and
has two peaks corresponding to Cournot and the highest possible output, 32, above Walras.11 Although
11 Six times, out of thirty-six, an output level of 32 is chosen, resulting in large falls in profits. This might be
an indication that some subjects were confused, desperate or bored. For those interested in the analysis of individual
behavior we should add that only one of the six cases could be called imitation, in period 21, of the previous most
successful decision. But even the firm that appeared to imitate in period 21 did not do so again in period 22.11
we are not concerned in this paper with providing an explanation for observed behavior, this spreading
out, and the decrease of collusion with respect to the ‘easy’ version, may be the result of the added
difficulty in learning about the environment, making it more difficult to discover the Pareto output, and
making it less useful to punish the other player, since punishment makes sense only if one believes the
other understands what is expected from him when punished. The spreading out is equally notorious in
the ‘hardest’ case, but while the average output increased from ‘easy’ to ‘hard’, it slightly fell from ‘hard’
to ‘hardest’. As can be seen from the graphs, this is not due to a fall in the relative frequency of outputs
around the Walrasian equilibrium, but to a fall in the frequency of outputs in between Cournot-Nash and
Walras, and to a frequency increase for outputs between Pareto and Cournot-Nash.
Is imitation driving the players to the Walrasian output level? First, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(Wilcoxon test from here on) shows that the players produce significantly more in the ‘hard’ version than
in the ‘easy’ version (0.0% significance; 1-sided). Second, using the same test we find that firms produce
significantly less than the Walrasian output level (significant at 0.0%, 1-sided). Third, we apply the sign
test to determine the 90% confidence interval for the median output level. Thanks to the spread in output
levels this ranges from 20 to 26, still away from the Walrasian equilibrium, but including the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of 20.
Applying the same tests to the ‘hardest’ duopolies, we find that they produce significantly more than
in the ‘easy’ duopoly (0.7%; 1-sided Wilcoxon), but less than the Walrasian output of 30 (0.0%; 1-sided
Wilcoxon), while there is no significant difference with the ‘hard’ duopolies. The 90% confidence interval
for the median output (20 to 25; sign test) is even farther away from the Walrasian output than in the
‘hard’ version, including again the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Hence, the hypothesis that in the ‘hard’ and
‘hardest’ treatments the Walrasian equilibrium would be a good description of the market must be rejected














Figure 3 Frequency distribution of individual output levels in the ‘easy’ triopoly, last two periods
Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution for the triopolies in the ‘easy’ treatment, the baseline
treatment. We observe that there is a wider spread of output levels than in the baseline duopoly session,
and that practically no collusion occurs. The latter is related, according to the usual explanation, to the
increased difficulty, with three rather than two subjects, to learn what other players are up to, and to
reward and punish individual players since the only available instruments work through the market and
do not discriminate between players. The most frequent output levels in the last two periods are 23 (10
times), 22 (6 times), and 21 (4 times). Remember that Cournot-Nash is at 22. The 90% confidence interval
for the median output goes from 23 to 24 (sign test). This, again, confirms previous experimental
observations. As in the ‘easy’ duopoly, spite effects are not prevalent in this baseline treatment. We want
again to verify whether they come to the fore as we make the players’ learning-about-the-environment task





























Figure 4 Frequency distributions of individual output levels in the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ triopoly,
last two periods
The frequency distributions of output levels for the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ triopoly are given in figures 4.a
and 4.b. One observation again stands out, which is the wider spreading of choices compared to the ‘easy’
version. In the ‘hard’ version, the frequency of the Walrasian output actually decreases, while Cournot-
Nash loses in frequency in favor of lower values. The highest frequency in periods 21 and 22 corresponds
to outputs of 18, 20, and 25 (4 times each), and the average output in the last two periods is 24.3. The
odd outputs of 31 and 32, possibly mere end effects, help pull up this average. The spread is not surprising
due to the added difficulty in learning about the environment. But it is also an indication that imitation
of the successful firms was not frequent. Let us apply the same statistical tests as before. First, a Wilcoxon
test rejects the null hypothesis that the output levels are higher in the ‘hard’ triopoly than in the
corresponding ‘easy’ treatment (significant at 48.0%; 1-sided), confirming that they are lower than the
Walrasian output levels (significant at 0.1%; 1-sided). Second, a sign test provides us with a 90%
confidence interval for the median output level ranging from 21 to 28, including the Cournot-Nash output
of 22 but not the Walrasian output of 30.
In the ‘hardest’ triopolies, the modal output in the last two periods is 24 (6 times), followed by 30 (5
times), with an average of 26.4. Although the spread is again considerable, it is concentrated most of all
in the range from 24 to 32. This output is significantly higher than in the ‘easy’ version (0.0%
significance; 1-sided Wilcoxon), but not higher than in the ‘hard’ triopolies (6.2%; 1-sided Wilcoxon).
Moreover, output in the ‘hardest’ triopolies is significantly lower than the Walrasian level of 30 (0.0%;
1-sided Wilcoxon). The sign test gives a 90% confidence interval for the median output from 25 to 28,
in the middle between Cournot-Nash, and Walras. As mentioned above, this treatment was the only one
for which the tests based on the individual data did not lead to the same conclusion as those based on the14
independent market observations. Using as observations the average output over the last two periods in
each market, we find that the output in the ‘hardest’ triopolies is not significantly higher than in the ‘easy’
triopolies (8.7%; 1-sided Wilcoxon), whereas the 90% confidence interval for the median output ranges
from 21 to 29 (sign test), including only the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Hence, we have to conclude that in the triopoly sessions, a case in favor of the hypothesis seems rather
weak at best. Combining the evidence for the duopolies and triopolies, on the basis of our analysis of the
output levels in the last two periods, two general conclusions can be drawn.
Fact 1: As the learning-about-the-environment task becomes more complex, output choices
become more spread out.
Whether this is due to errors, misunderstandings, chance or deliberate decisions, it is not for us to clarify.
In any case, the equation between environmental complexity and uncertainty of results seems to be
confirmed in all cases.
Fact 2: As the learning-about-the-environment task becomes more complex, output
increases, but the Walrasian output is not a good description of the output levels observed
in the experiment.12
Therefore, one can safely reject the hypothesis that imitation related to bounded rationality drives the
players to the Walrasian output level.
4.2 The trend
Since the hypothesis to be tested concerns an equilibrium prediction, our analysis thus far was based on
the output levels in the last two periods. Nevertheless, data from previous periods can help decide whether
there is anything in the dynamics which suggests that running the experiment longer would lead to output
levels closer to the Walrasian output. As we will see, there is no such evidence.
12 While the absence of Walrasian outputs implies little or no imitation, it is not necessarily true, as we argued
above, that a high frequency of Walrasian or near-Walrasian outputs would be a sign of imitation. These outputs


















Figure 5 Time series of the average output in duopolies
Figure 5 gives the time series of the average outputs in the duopolies. In the ‘easy’ duopolies, output starts
just below 20, and slowly decreases as collusion builds up. With the collapse of collusion in the last two
periods, output shoots up towards Cournot-Nash. In the ‘hard’ duopoly, output starts slightly below 20
as well, increases to 22.7 in period 2, and then very slowly goes down to 19.4 in period 20, followed by
an end effect leading to 23.6 in period 22. Hence, it stays close to Cournot-Nash, and if a trend exists
during the first 20 periods, it is downward sloping. We see a very similar pattern in the ‘hardest’ duopoly
treatment. Average output starts at 19.3, reaches a peak in period 4 at 23.1, followed by fluctuations
around Cournot-Nash until the last period, where we see a jump to 24.1. The conclusion is that in the

















Figure 6 Time series of the average output in triopolies16
Figure 6 shows the average output levels for the triopolies. In the ‘easy’ triopolies, output starts slightly
below 20, increases a little bit until period 5, and then stays relatively constant till the end. There is no
end effect, as collusion was never established. In the ‘hard’ triopolies, output starts at 16.3, increases to
24.9 in period 4, and then slowly decreases to 21.8 in period 16, followed by a slight increase to 22.5 in
period 20 (remember Cournot-Nash is at 22), and 24.6 in period 22. Notice that the average output level
from period 11 to 20 is always lower than in the ‘easy’ baseline treatment. The ‘hardest’ triopolies, are
somewhat different, but not too much. The average output level in period 1 is 20.2, followed by a quick
jump to 24.5 in the second period, and reaches a first peak at 26.8 in period 8. After this, the average
output level fluctuates somewhat, with a dip of 23.8 in period 18, and a value in the final period of 25.9.
As we see, the series is consistently above the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ series, but apart from the increase in the
first periods, there is no upward trend.
In conclusion, the analysis of all the 22 periods of the sessions does not reveal any trend towards the
competitive equilibrium in any of the six treatments. Nothing in the observed decisions seems to indicate
that the sessions were too short for convergence to the Walrasian equilibrium. Of course, on the basis of
our experimental evidence reported here we cannot exclude that such an upward trend itself might start
later. But our hypothesis concerned imitation based on bounded rationality, and the longer the sessions
go on, the less of an issue is bounded rationality, because players learn more and more about the
environment. Hence, even if a trend were to start later on, it would be hard to explain it in terms of
bounded rationality.
But, apart from this logical point, we actually did gather some evidence as to whether an upward trend
might start later. In the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ duopolies and triopolies, once the 22 periods of each session
were finished, we informed subjects that since the session had run so smoothly and fast, we still had some
time left and that we would repeat the same experiment with the same matches for another 12 periods,
the last two periods having again payoffs ten times the payoffs of the previous periods. In these 12 periods
again, there is no sign of a trend towards Walras. Average output levels are close to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, except for an end effect.13 Therefore we can state the following.
Fact 3: Absence of a trend towards the Walrasian equilibrium.
One might argue that what happens in the periods 1 to 20 is in some sense cheap talk in preparation for
the last two periods, which offer much higher payoffs. There is no denying that this could be the case.
However, if it were so, then we would be dealing with some kind of strategic behavior, which implies a
13 We do not fully report these data since the procedure may be deemed controversial and the results spurious
for the strict purpose of the experiment. Yet they throw some light on whether a trend towards Walrasian results was
lurking in our sessions of 22 periods. The corresponding graphs are available from the authors upon request.17
reasoning process at a higher cognitive level than the learning-through-imitation hypothesis assumes. To
the extent that some of this may be happening in the duopoly markets, it reinforces the conclusion that
imitation is not a driving force in our experiments.14 That end effects are hardly noticeable in the
triopoly markets indicates that in these markets the first twenty periods are not mere foreplay and the
absence of any convergence towards Walras should be taken at face value.
The conclusion of this section is that the absence of a trend towards Walrasian output indicates that
imitation does not play a significant role in our experimental market.
4.3 Individual Behavior
We feel that a more systematic analysis of the individual period-to-period decisions is unnecessary. The
essential reason being that imitation in these Cournot markets interests us to the extent that it has an effect
on the output levels. And there is no amount of analysis of individual data that could change the
conclusions reached above. There are additional reasons to be skeptical about the usefulness of the analysis
of individual decisions. Even the observation that subjects choose the output level that was more profitable
in the previous period is no sure indication of imitative behavior. Of course, if imitation is defined that
way, then we have to call it imitation. But the analysis requires more subtlety. Consider, for example, that
a subject follows a deliberate tit-for-tat strategy. This requires a deeper level of cognitive involvement than
simple imitation of successful behavior. Therefore, it would be misleading to call a tit-for-tat strategy, or
in general any reciprocating strategy of the type ‘give-as-good-as-you-get’ (GGG), an imitative strategy,
even though it amounts to the same decision when the firm responds tat to the non-cooperative, but
successful, decision of another firm to increase its output. Notice that simple imitation of successful
behavior and deliberate GGG strategies may lead to very different results. A GGG strategy in a Cournot
market may lead to a competitive equilibrium, but it may also lead to the collusive solution. Hence, there
exist strategies that resemble, in single periods, imitation of successful behavior, while in fact they
represent a different behavior that, in particular, does not necessarily share the same dynamics.
In spite of our doubts about the procedure, but in order to illustrate the issues faced, we will analyze
the individual behavior in the market for firms 4, 10 and 16 in the ‘hard’ triopoly treatment. We choose
this market because with its average output in the last 2 periods of 29.8 it was the one that converged
most to the Walrasian output of 30. This seems the ideal set-up for finding imitative behavior. Table 2
shows the individual decisions and profits in this market, plus the most successful decisions with
corresponding profits. If by imitation we mean taking the same decision as was taken by the most
successful firm in the previous period, then firm 16 does not imitate at all for the 21 periods. Firm 10
14 The same argument applies to any other form of dynamically strategic behavior.18
imitated the successful behavior of another firm only twice out of 21 possibilities. The first time is in
period 2, which might be genuine imitation. The second time is in period 21, but here we are dealing with
a rather weak form of imitation since in the previous period all three firms, firm 10 included, had identical
profits. Hence, one could argue that this subject, as the experiment proceeds, very quickly learns not to
imitate. Finally, firm 4 seems to have imitated somewhat more, 6 out of 21 times. But when we look more
carefully at what the subject does, it turns out that 4 out of these 6 times he imitates himself. That again
is a rather weak form of imitation since it means staying put at some successful output level, which could
simply indicate immobility.
If instead of strict imitation of the most successful firm, we look for a rather broad class of behavior,
requiring only that a firm moves into the direction of the previously most successful firm, independently
of by much,15 we find that these three firms ‘imitate’ in 12, 10, and 10 periods respectively; an average
frequency of 50.1%. Analysis of the individual behavior in other sessions shows similar patterns.
To sum it up, evidence on the individual period-to-period decisions bolsters our earlier conclusion based
on the analysis of the output levels, and illustrates the difficulties to identify imitation proper.

















* is the most successful output in period t.19
firm 4 firm 10 firm 16 most successful
period output profits output profits output profits output profits
1 10 2306 8 1898 20 4346 20 4346
2 22 2818 20 2586 18 2354 22 2818
3 23 1830 28 2170 21 1694 28 2170
4 29 1310 26 1202 25 1166 29 1310
5 29 3282 20 2346 14 1722 29 3282
6 29 2006 15 1166 30 2066 30 2066
7 30 1946 20 1386 25 1666 30 1946
8 28 2618 20 1946 20 1946 28 2618
9 25 1766 20 1466 29 2006 29 2006
10 30 866 22 706 32 906 32 906
11 31 2994 16 1674 20 2026 31 2994
12 30 146 32 138 28 154 32 154
13 26 1618 25 1566 25 1566 26 1618
14 26 1930 19 1482 28 2058 28 2058
15 30 1826 20 1306 26 1618 30 1826
16 29 1310 23 1094 28 1274 29 1310
17 29 846 23 726 32 906 32 906
18 31 1134 24 938 27 1022 31 1134
19 30 146 30 146 30 146 30 146
20 32 266 29 266 28 266 28/29/32 266
21 30 506 32 522 25 466 32 522
22 32 -118 29 -82 31 -106 29 -82
Table 2 Individual actions and outcomes in one ‘hard’ triopoly market
5. Conclusion
Theory has shown that ‘imitating the best’ leads to the competitive equilibrium in Cournot markets.
Since imitation seems simple, it was natural to infer that the competitive output would be likely in such
markets, provided that subjects were ‘boundedly rational’ enough and knew whom to imitate. We believe
that our experiment has shown that this conclusion is unwarranted. In spite of our efforts at scrambling
information and at flashing on the screen, each period, the most successful decision, we did not manage
to induce imitation of the most successful players.
Why, then, do boundedly rational people not imitate in Cournot markets? Imitation in our setup was
straightforward and simple but, boundedly rational as subjects can be, they still possess an arsenal of
responses to somebody else’s actions; among them the use of their imagination (see Selten [1978]).16
In addition, in the Cournot game, a player, by systematically imitating more successful players, would
worsen her own payoffs. Even in the treatments with scrambled information, it did not take long for
subjects to discover this fact.
16 A Cournot game allows for subtle behavior, and it would be surprising if subjects got stuck in a strategy of
plain imitation. Consider, as an example in another context, the richness of reciprocal interactions among boundedly
rational beings, in this case guillemots (Uriae aalge), as reported by Roberts and Sherratt [1998].20
After we had run our experiments, we learned that some other people were pursuing a similar track (see
Huck et al. [1999], and Offerman et al. [1997]). While our conclusion seems to be at odds with theirs, it
does confirm preliminary experimental findings by Allsop & Hey [1997], who test for herd behavior in
an experimental setup and find that players rely much more on their private signals than some theoretical
work had suggested (see Banerjee [1992]), and by Holt [1998] and others on minimal effort games. With
respect to Cournot games, Dixon et al. [1996] show that there are evolutionary processes that lead to
Pareto outcomes, and Eichberger & Kelsey [1999] demonstrate how Knightian uncertainty leads to an
equilibrium with output levels below Cournot-Nash (away from the Walrasian equilibrium) in a one-shot
Cournot game.
That imitation has not been observed in our experiments, while an indication that imitation based on
bounded rationality is not prevalent in this particular kind of games, does not belittle the hypothesis of
imitation in other circumstances, for example, in survival-of-the-fittest type situations. Ultimately, what
one could hope to achieve is a classification of situations and games according to the prevalence of
imitation. Our contribution to such a project is to warn against simply assuming imitation in theoretical
models, because the boundary between these two classes may be located at a place that is different from
where some people seem to expect or assume.
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Appendix A. The Spite Effect and the Cournot Oligopoly
The essence of the spite effect is illustrated by the bimatrix game in figure A1 (see Palomino [1995]), where T
and B are the two possible strategies, and the lowercase letters are the payoffs to the row and column player, with
a>b>c>d. Clearly, (T, T) is the only Nash equilibrium since no player can improve by deviating from it, and this is
the only combination for which this holds. Now, consider the strategy pair (B, T), leading to the payoffs (b, c).
Remember that a>b>c>d. Hence, by deviating from the Nash equilibrium, the row player hurts her own payoff, but
she hurts the column player’s payoff even more.
TB
T a , ac , b
B b , cd , d
Figure A1 Bimatrix game, with payoffs a>b>c>d
Let us now focus on a standard symmetric Cournot oligopoly. There is a number of symmetrical firms producing
the same homogeneous commodity. The only decision variable for firm i is the quantity qi to be produced. Once
production has taken place, for all firms simultaneously, the firms bring their output to the market, where the market
price P is determined such that demand equals supply. In order to give the intuition behind the spite effect in this
Cournot game, let us consider a simple symmetric Cournot market in which the inverse demand function is P(Q)
= a + bQ, where Q = Sqi, and in which the cost function for the individual firm is TC(q) = K + kq . Making the
appropriate assumptions on the parameters a and b ensures that the demand curve is downward-sloping. We can
distinguish three symmetric equilibria of the static Cournot oligopoly game specified above for the case in which
the players have complete information. First, suppose that the two firms collude, maximizing their joint-profits. This
leads to an aggregate output level called Pareto QP = (k-a)/(2b). Second, if the firms behave as price-takers in a
competitive market, they simply produce up to the point where their marginal costs are equal to the market price P.
Given the specification of the oligopoly model above, this implies an aggregate competitive, or Walrasian, output
level of QW = (k-a)/b. If, instead, the firms realize that they influence the market price through their own output, they
produce up to the point where their marginal costs are equal to their marginal revenue. Taking the output level of
the other firm as given, this leads to an aggregate Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of QN = (k-a)/[b((1/n)+1)]. Which
of these three equilibria occurs depends upon which behavioral assumption is the correct one. Do players collude?22
Do they behave as price-takers? Or do they realize they influence the market price themselves?
To see how a spite effect might influence the outcomes of a Cournot market game, suppose, to simplify for
illustrative convenience, that there are only two firms and that fixed and marginal costs are zero (see Schaffer
[1989]), and let us concentrate on the Walrasian equilibrium. Observe that there are two alternative ways to look at
it, based on different behavioral assumptions. In both cases it is the spite effect that makes it an equilibrium. First,
suppose that the firms’ preferences are such that they do not care about absolute payoffs, but only about relative
payoffs. Any utility function assigning a higher value to an outcome in which the firm beats the other firm, and a
lower value to an outcome in which it gets beaten will, after elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, leave













Figure A2 Example Cournot duopoly
To see why this is the only strategy where a firm is sure it can never be beaten, look at figure A2, and focus on the
Walrasian output QW. Suppose firm i produces its equal share of the Walrasian output: qi = QW/2. If firm j would
do the same, aggregate output is QW, the market price P will be zero, and both make a zero profit. What happens
when firm j produces more than QW/2? The price P will become negative, and both firms will make losses. But it
is firm i that makes less losses, because it has a lower output level sold at the same market price P. What happens
instead if firm j produces less than QW/2? The price P will be positive, and hence this will increase firm j’s profits.
But again it is firm i that makes a greater profit, because it has a higher output level sold at the same market price
P. In some sense, firm i is free riding on firm j’s production restraint. Hence, the firm that produces its equal share
of QW will have the highest relative payoff in this Cournot duopoly. Note that this implies in particular the following.
If firm i produces its share of the symmetric Walrasian output, while firm j naively chooses the symmetric output
level to maximize its absolute payoffs (i.e., its equal share of the Cournot-Nash output), it is firm i that realizes the
highest profits. Moreover, even if firm j is aware of the fact that firm i is producing at the Walrasian output level,
and maximizes its profits taking this into account, it is firm i that realizes the highest payoffs. In case we consider
more than two firms, matters become slightly more complicated, but the following holds. Whenever the aggregate
output level is below Walras, i.e., on average an individual firm produces less than its share of the Walrasian output
level, the price will be positive, and it is the firms with the higher output levels that generate the higher profits.
Exactly the reverse holds when aggregate output exceeds the Walrasian output level: the lower a firm’s output level,
the higher its profits will be.
Now, suppose that the firms do not have a preference to beat their competitors, but that they are boundedly
rational and tend to imitate successful behavior in the sense that the probability to choose any output level is a
positive monotonic function of the profits realized in the past. Whenever the average output is below Walras, it is23
the highest output firm, realizing the highest profit, that is most likely to be imitated, and the other way round. As
a result the market will converge to the Walrasian equilibrium.
Appendix B. Instructions to the Players
Table B1 gives the English translation of the Spanish instructions to the players in the ‘easy’ duopoly.
Instructions
Introduction
• This is a decision experiment. The instructions are simple, and if you pay attention, you can gain a reasonable
amount of money that will be paid to you at the end of the experiment. From now on till the end of the
experiment you are not allowed to communicate with each other. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
• Each of you will play a firm that produces a fictitious good that is sold in a fictitious market.
• Within each market there will be only 2 firms that sell the same good. One is your firm, and the other is a firm
that is identical to yours.
• Who will be this other firm will be decided randomly.
• The other people in the laboratory participate in other markets that have nothing to do with yours. In other
words, various markets will operate simultaneously, but independently, in the laboratory.
• You will never know the identity of the person you are matched with, nor will he be aware of yours.
• The experiment will last 22 consecutive periods, and the other firm that participates in your market will be the
same during all periods of the experiment.
Decisions and Outcomes
• Each period all firms simultaneously make only 1 decision: the quantity to be produced and supplied to the
market. Only integer values from 8 to 32 can be chosen.
• You will get a table showing the various levels of profit or loss you and the other firms can attain depending
upon the quantities chosen by you and the other firm. The quantities one firm (firm X) may produce are listed
across the top of the table, while the quantities produced by the other firm are listed down the left-hand margin.
The profits for firm X and for the other firm are given within the body of the table by the intersection of the
quantities produced. The top number in bold gives the profit for firm X, whereas the bottom number in italic
gives the profit of the other firm. Since the two firms are identical, at any moment you can identify either yourself
or the other firm with firm X. We will do some exercises with the table in a moment.
• After each period, you will get some information on your screen. At the top part of the screen, you will see your
output level, and that of the other firm in the previous period. At the bottom part, you will see the history of your
own output levels and profits realized.
• There is no time limit for your period to period decisions. Decisions will ordinarily be made every few minutes
or so.
Payment
• Each player gets a fixed fee of 250 Pesetas just for participating in the experiment.
• In addition, each player will be paid according to the total profits realized by his firm.
• During the periods 1 to 20, the monetary reward will be 0.035 Pesetas for every profit point realized.
• During the periods 21 and 22 (the last 2 periods), the monetary reward will be 0.35 Pesetas for each profit
point realized. You will receive a reminder of this higher payoff (10 times as high) at the start of period 21.
• Note that losses realized will be subtracted from the 250 Pesetas.
• At the end of the experiment, we will add up your profits, and calculate your monetary rewards. This will be
done such that you will not see what other players earned.24
Keyboard
• To make your choice of output level, please enter a number. Remember that only integer values from 8 to 32
can be chosen.
• To confirm (or not) your choices, enter Y (or N) with your keyboard.
• Please, before confirming your choices, always make sure that you did not make a typing-error.
Table B1 Instructions ‘easy’ duopoly
Table B2 shows the instructions given to the players in the ‘hard’ duopoly. We only list the subsection ‘Decisions
and Outcomes’, which replaces the corresponding subsection in the ‘easy’ duopoly. The remainder of the instructions
was identical to the ‘easy’ version.
Instructions
Decisions and Outcomes
• Each period all firms simultaneously make only 1 decision: the quantity to be produced and supplied to the
market. Only integer values from 8 to 32 can be chosen.
(•) Given the TOTAL quantity supplied to the market by you and the other firm in a given period, the price is
determined by the market. For total output levels from 16 to 64, taking steps of 1, the market prices will be 350
(with total output equal to 16), 346, 342, 338, 334, 330, 326, 322, 318, 314, 310, 306, 302, 298, 294, 290, 286,
282, 278, 274, 270, 266, 262, 258, 254, 250, 246, 242, 238, 234, 230, 226, 222, 218, 214, 210, 206, 202, 198,
194, 190, 186, 182, 178, 174, 170, 166, 162, 158 (64). This market price implies the revenue a firm gets for
EACH UNIT it supplied to the market. Assume that all units produced are actually sold.
• For a given period, the costs to a firm producing a certain quantity in that period are as follows, starting with
the minimum output of 8, and going in unit steps to the maximum output of 32: 1246 (with output equal to 8),
1420, 1594, 1768, 1942, 2116, 2290, 2464, 2638, 2812, 2986, 3160, 3334, 3508, 3682, 3856, 4030, 4204,
4378, 4552, 4726, 4900, 5074, 5248, 5422 (32).
• The profits to a firm for a given period are simply its revenues minus its costs.
• After each period, you will get some information on your screen. You will see your output level, and that of each
of the other firms in the previous period, plus the profits realized by you and by the other firms in the that period.
We also indicate (with *****) which firm realized the highest profit in the previous period.
• There is a 1 minute time limit for your period to period decisions. The experimenter will give a warning after 30
seconds, after 50 seconds, and after 60 seconds.
Table B2 Instructions ‘hard’ duopoly
The only change made in the instructions of the ‘hardest’ duopoly with respect to the ‘hard’ version was that the
information concerning the market demand was removed, that is, the item marked (•) in table B2.
The following table was given to the players in the ‘easy’ duopolies, with the bold faced numbers indicating the
profits for firm X, and the numbers in italic the profits for the other firm.PROFITS output firm X
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
output 1554 1694 1826 1950 2066 2174 2274 2366 2450 2526 2594 2654 2706 2750 2786 2814 2834 2846 2850 2846 2834 2814 2786 2750 2706
other firm 8 1554 1522 1490 1458 1426 1394 1362 1330 1298 1266 1234 1202 1170 1138 1106 1074 1042 1010 978 946 914 882 850 818 786
1522 1658 1786 1906 2018 2122 2218 2306 2386 2458 2522 2578 2626 2666 2698 2722 2738 2746 2746 2738 2722 2698 2666 2626 2578
9 1694 1658 1622 1586 1550 1514 1478 1442 1406 1370 1334 1298 1262 1226 1190 1154 1118 1082 1046 1010 974 938 902 866 830
1490 1622 1746 1862 1970 2070 2162 2246 2322 2390 2450 2502 2546 2582 2610 2630 2642 2646 2642 2630 2610 2582 2546 2502 2450
10 1826 1786 1746 1706 1666 1626 1586 1546 1506 1466 1426 1386 1346 1306 1266 1226 1186 1146 1106 1066 1026 986 946 906 866
1458 1586 1706 1818 1922 2018 2106 2186 2258 2322 2378 2426 2466 2498 2522 2538 2546 2546 2538 2522 2498 2466 2426 2378 2322
11 1950 1906 1862 1818 1774 1730 1686 1642 1598 1554 1510 1466 1422 1378 1334 1290 1246 1202 1158 1114 1070 1026 982 938 894
1426 1550 1666 1774 1874 1966 2050 2126 2194 2254 2306 2350 2386 2414 2434 2446 2450 2446 2434 2414 2386 2350 2306 2254 2194
12 2066 2018 1970 1922 1874 1826 1778 1730 1682 1634 1586 1538 1490 1442 1394 1346 1298 1250 1202 1154 1106 1058 1010 962 914
1394 1514 1626 1730 1826 1914 1994 2066 2130 2186 2234 2274 2306 2330 2346 2354 2354 2346 2330 2306 2274 2234 2186 2130 2066
13 2174 2122 2070 2018 1966 1914 1862 1810 1758 1706 1654 1602 1550 1498 1446 1394 1342 1290 1238 1186 1134 1082 1030 978 926
1362 1478 1586 1686 1778 1862 1938 2006 2066 2118 2162 2198 2226 2246 2258 2262 2258 2246 2226 2198 2162 2118 2066 2006 1938
14 2274 2218 2162 2106 2050 1994 1938 1882 1826 1770 1714 1658 1602 1546 1490 1434 1378 1322 1266 1210 1154 1098 1042 986 930
1330 1442 1546 1642 1730 1810 1882 1946 2002 2050 2090 2122 2146 2162 2170 2170 2162 2146 2122 2090 2050 2002 1946 1882 1810
15 2366 2306 2246 2186 2126 2066 2006 1946 1886 1826 1766 1706 1646 1586 1526 1466 1406 1346 1286 1226 1166 1106 1046 986 926
1298 1406 1506 1598 1682 1758 1826 1886 1938 1982 2018 2046 2066 2078 2082 2078 2066 2046 2018 1982 1938 1886 1826 1758 1682
16 2450 2386 2322 2258 2194 2130 2066 2002 1938 1874 1810 1746 1682 1618 1554 1490 1426 1362 1298 1234 1170 1106 1042 978 914
1266 1370 1466 1554 1634 1706 1770 1826 1874 1914 1946 1970 1986 1994 1994 1986 1970 1946 1914 1874 1826 1770 1706 1634 1554
17 2526 2458 2390 2322 2254 2186 2118 2050 1982 1914 1846 1778 1710 1642 1574 1506 1438 1370 1302 1234 1166 1098 1030 962 894
1234 1334 1426 1510 1586 1654 1714 1766 1810 1846 1874 1894 1906 1910 1906 1894 1874 1846 1810 1766 1714 1654 1586 1510 1426
18 2594 2522 2450 2378 2306 2234 2162 2090 2018 1946 1874 1802 1730 1658 1586 1514 1442 1370 1298 1226 1154 1082 1010 938 866
1202 1298 1386 1466 1538 1602 1658 1706 1746 1778 1802 1818 1826 1826 1818 1802 1778 1746 1706 1658 1602 1538 1466 1386 1298
19 2654 2578 2502 2426 2350 2274 2198 2122 2046 1970 1894 1818 1742 1666 1590 1514 1438 1362 1286 1210 1134 1058 982 906 830
1170 1262 1346 1422 1490 1550 1602 1646 1682 1710 1730 1742 1746 1742 1730 1710 1682 1646 1602 1550 1490 1422 1346 1262 1170
20 2706 2626 2546 2466 2386 2306 2226 2146 2066 1986 1906 1826 1746 1666 1586 1506 1426 1346 1266 1186 1106 1026 946 866 786
1138 1226 1306 1378 1442 1498 1546 1586 1618 1642 1658 1666 1666 1658 1642 1618 1586 1546 1498 1442 1378 1306 1226 1138 1042
21 2750 2666 2582 2498 2414 2330 2246 2162 2078 1994 1910 1826 1742 1658 1574 1490 1406 1322 1238 1154 1070 986 902 818 734
1106 1190 1266 1334 1394 1446 1490 1526 1554 1574 1586 1590 1586 1574 1554 1526 1490 1446 1394 1334 1266 1190 1106 1014 914
22 2786 2698 2610 2522 2434 2346 2258 2170 2082 1994 1906 1818 1730 1642 1554 1466 1378 1290 1202 1114 1026 938 850 762 674
1074 1154 1226 1290 1346 1394 1434 1466 1490 1506 1514 1514 1506 1490 1466 1434 1394 1346 1290 1226 1154 1074 986 890 786
23 2814 2722 2630 2538 2446 2354 2262 2170 2078 1986 1894 1802 1710 1618 1526 1434 1342 1250 1158 1066 974 882 790 698 606
1042 1118 1186 1246 1298 1342 1378 1406 1426 1438 1442 1438 1426 1406 1378 1342 1298 1246 1186 1118 1042 958 866 766 658
24 2834 2738 2642 2546 2450 2354 2258 2162 2066 1970 1874 1778 1682 1586 1490 1394 1298 1202 1106 1010 914 818 722 626 530
1010 1082 1146 1202 1250 1290 1322 1346 1362 1370 1370 1362 1346 1322 1290 1250 1202 1146 1082 1010 930 842 746 642 530
25 2846 2746 2646 2546 2446 2346 2246 2146 2046 1946 1846 1746 1646 1546 1446 1346 1246 1146 1046 946 846 746 646 546 446
978 1046 1106 1158 1202 1238 1266 1286 1298 1302 1298 1286 1266 1238 1202 1158 1106 1046 978 902 818 726 626 518 402
26 2850 2746 2642 2538 2434 2330 2226 2122 2018 1914 1810 1706 1602 1498 1394 1290 1186 1082 978 874 770 666 562 458 354
946 1010 1066 1114 1154 1186 1210 1226 1234 1234 1226 1210 1186 1154 1114 1066 1010 946 874 794 706 610 506 394 274
27 2846 2738 2630 2522 2414 2306 2198 2090 1982 1874 1766 1658 1550 1442 1334 1226 1118 1010 902 794 686 578 470 362 254
914 974 1026 1070 1106 1134 1154 1166 1170 1166 1154 1134 1106 1070 1026 974 914 846 770 686 594 494 386 270 146
28 2834 2722 2610 2498 2386 2274 2162 2050 1938 1826 1714 1602 1490 1378 1266 1154 1042 930 818 706 594 482 370 258 146
882 938 986 1026 1058 1082 1098 1106 1106 1098 1082 1058 1026 986 938 882 818 746 666 578 482 378 266 146 18
29 2814 2698 2582 2466 2350 2234 2118 2002 1886 1770 1654 1538 1422 1306 1190 1074 958 842 726 610 494 378 262 146 30
850 902 946 982 1010 1030 1042 1046 1042 1030 1010 982 946 902 850 790 722 646 562 470 370 262 146 22 -110
30 2786 2666 2546 2426 2306 2186 2066 1946 1826 1706 1586 1466 1346 1226 1106 986 866 746 626 506 386 266 146 26 -94
818 866 906 938 962 978 986 986 978 962 938 906 866 818 762 698 626 546 458 362 258 146 26 -102 -238
31 2750 2626 2502 2378 2254 2130 2006 1882 1758 1634 1510 1386 1262 1138 1014 890 766 642 518 394 270 146 22 -102 -226
786 830 866 894 914 926 930 926 914 894 866 830 786 734 674 606 530 446 354 254 146 30 -94 -226 -366
32 2706 2578 2450 2322 2194 2066 1938 1810 1682 1554 1426 1298 1170 1042 914 786 658 530 402 274 146 18 -110 -238 -36626
Figures B1 and B2 present two examples of the screens faced by the players. First, the ‘easy’ version of the
triopolies in figure B1.
Figure B1 Example screen ‘easy’ version
previous period (period 2): your production: 20
production firm X: 8
production firm Y: 17
next period (period 3): your production: ... (please Enter)
history:
























The screen faced by the players in the ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ triopolies is shown in figure B2.
Figure B2 Example screen ‘hard’ and ‘hardest’ version
previous period (period 2):
production profit best
you 20 3786 *****
firm X 8 1674
firm Y 17 3258
next period (period 3):
your production: ... (please Enter)